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INVESTIGATIVE DEMANDS UNDER
OHIO'S ANTITRUST LAW: A CLOSE
LOOK AT THE STATUTE*
Stanley A. Freedman**
Since March 13, 1978, the Ohio Attorney General has had the
power to issue civil antitrust investigative demands.' The statute giving
him that power was drafted by the Office of the Attorney General and
enacted substantially in the form in which it was submitted. It draws
heavily upon the Federal Antitrust Civil Process Act,2 parallel state
statutes, 3 and the investigative provisions contained in the Uniform
State Antitrust Act.'
The Ohio statute does not, however, precisely track any of its
predecessors. Partly for that reason, and partly because of infelicities
of draftsmanship, it contains a number of ambiguities and presents a
number of problems which require careful attention.
*This paper was prepared for presentation at a program sponsored by the
Antitrust Section of the Ohio State Bar Association during the Association's Annual
Meeting in Dayton, Ohio, on May 5, 1978. David Barnette and David Gilmore,
members of the Classes of 1979 and 1978, respectively, at the University of Dayton
School of Law, provided able research assistance in its preparation.
**Partner, Smith & Schnacke, Dayton, Ohio. B.A., Harvard University, 1943;
J.D. Harvard Law School, 1949. Member, New York Bar Association, Ohio Bar
Association.
1.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§§

1331.i6, .99(A) (Page Supp. 1978). Section

1331.16 was enacted and section 1331.99(A) was amended by Am. Sub. H.B. 410,
112th G.A., Reg. Sess. (1977) (eff. Mar. 13, 1978).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976).
3. Similar statutes providing for investigative demands may be found in the
following states: ARIz. REV. STAT. § 44-1406 (West Supp. 1977-78), CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 35-42 (West Supp. 1978), HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-18 (West 1976), ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.2 (Smith-Hurd 1977), IOWA CODE ANN. § 553.9 (West Supp.
1978-79), KAN. STAT. § 50-153 (1976), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 51 §§ 143-44 (West
1965), ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10 § 1107 (1964), MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-205
(1975), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.907 (West Supp. 1978), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.091

(Vernon Supp. 1978), NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1611 (Cum. Supp. 1976), NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 598A.100-140 (1973), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356: 10 (Supp. 1977), N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:9-9 (West Supp. 1978-79), N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW 22 § 343 (McKinney 1968), N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-9-13 (1975), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79 § 82 (West 1976), OR. REV.
STAT. § 646.750 (1977), S.C. CODE §§ 39-3-310, 320, 330 (1977), S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §§ 37-1-11.1, 11.2, 11.3 (1977), TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 15.14
(Vernon 1968), VA. CODE § 59.1-9.10 (1950), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.110
(1978), W. VA. CODE § 47-18-7 (Supp. 1976), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.06 (West 1974).
4. UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACr § 6.
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THE LEGISLATION

In form the new statute is an add-on to Ohio's venerable antitrust
law, the Valentine Act. 5 The Valentine Act declares "trusts" unlawful
and void. 6 "Trust" is defined in the old fashioned nineteenth century
sense (the same sense as in the more familiar "antitrust") as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons (a) to create or
carry out restrictions in trade or commerce, (b) to limit or reduce production, or increase or reduce the price of merchandise or a commodity, (c) to prevent competition in manufacturing, transporting, selling
or purchasing of merchandise, produce or a commodity, (d) to fix the
price of an article intended for sale, use or consumption in the state,
and (e) to make agreements to fix prices so as to preclude free competition in the sale or transportation of articles or to pool interests therein
in order to affect their prices. 7 Other sections of the Act prohibit
8
various combinations to fix prices or to control production, particu9 and declare agreements in
larly as related to specified articles of food,
violation to be void.'" In 1976, provisions were added, somewhat
awkwardly, prohibiting compliance with foreign boycotts."
3
Violations are punishable by forfeitures,'" criminal penalties,' and
private actions for damages."
The title of the new Investigative Demand Act states that the Act's
purpose is "to provide for effective discovery in civil antitrust investigations." 5 The title of the Act, however, is the only place in the
statute where "civil" modifies the words "investigative demand."
Given the constitutional imperative that every act state its purpose in
its title, it is to be hoped that the courts will read the word "civil" into
in the statute to an "investigative demand" (or
every reference
6
,,I.13.99). 1
5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1331.01, .15, .99 (Page 1962) (originally enacted as
Act of Apr. 19, 1898, 93 Ohio Laws 143 (1898).
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(B) (Page 1962).
7. Id.
8. Id. §§ 1331.02, .05.
9. Id. § 1331.05.
10. Id. § 1331.06.
11. Id. §§ 1331.01(B)(6), .02 (Page Supp. 1977).
12. Id. § 1331.03 (Page 1962).
13. Id. § 1331.99.
14. Id.§ 1331.08.
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
16. Art. II, § 15 of the Ohio Constitution requires that the subject of a bill be
clearly expressed in its title, in order to advise the legislators as to what they are voting
on. 50 OHIO JuR.2d Statutes § 144 (1961). There is authority for the proposition that the
title is no part of the substantive law, id. § 141 and cases cited at n.I therein, and to the
contrary, id. and cases cited at n.2 therein.
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The statute authorizes the Attorney General or his "designated
representative" to issue an investigative demand whenever the Attorney General has "reasonable cause to believe" that any person may be
in possession of any documentary material, or may have knowledge of
any fact, relevant to an investigation under the Valentine Act. 7 The
term "person" is given the definition set forth in section 1331.01(A) of
the Valentine Act, i.e., it "includes corporations, partnerships, and
associations existing under or authorized by any state or territory of
the United States ...
8 The investigative demand must be in
writing' 9 and is required to describe the conduct under investigation
and to state the provisions of law applicable thereto. 20 Also, if it is a
demand for the production of documentary material, it must describe
with reasonable particularity the documentary material to be produced, 2 provide a reasonable time within which to assemble the
material and make it available for inspection and copying,22 and identify the custodian to whom it is to be made available.2 3 If it is a
demand for answers to written interrogatories, it must identify the
representative of the Attorney General to whom the answers are to be
made and the answer date.2 ' If it is a demand for the giving of oral
testimony, it must prescribe a date, time and place for the taking of the
testimony, and identify the representative of the Attorney General who
shall conduct the oral examination. 5 The Act declares that no investigative demand shall contain any requirement that would be unreasonable if contained in a grand jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum
nor require the production of any documents or information that
would be privileged if demanded by a grand jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. 2'
Service of a demand is made by certified mail or delivery to the
person being investigated.27 The latter may be represented by counsel
on the taking of his deposition.2 8 Procedures applicable to the production of documents or information, except as otherwise provided,
17.
18.
19.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(A) (Page 1962).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(B) (Page Supp. 1978).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. § 1331.16(C)(1).
Id. § 1331.16(C)(2)(a).
Id. § 1331.16(C)(2)(b).
Id. § 1331.16(C)(2)(c).
Id. § 1331.16(C)(3)(a)-(b).
Id.
§ 1331.16(C)(4)(a)-(b).
Id. § 1331.16(D)(1)-(2).
Id.§ 1331.16(E).

28.

Id. § 1331.16(F).
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follow the discovery procedures established by the Rules of Civil Procedure.29
If the person under investigation refuses to produce documents or
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, an
appropriate common pleas court may compel production or testimony
upon the request of the Attorney General or his designated representative 3" and in that event the person so compelled will be immunized in
respect of any transaction or matter as to which he makes production
or testifies under compulsion. 3'
The sufficiency of a demand under the Act may be tested, in an appropriate common pleas court, by the person served, and the time for
production is tolled during pendency of the proceeding." Upon any
failure to comply "fully" with a demand, the Attorney General may,
on notice to the person served, seek a common pleas court order compelling compliance. If the court finds that noncompliance was in bad
faith or for the purpose of delay, the court may require the person
served to pay the reasonable expenses incurred by the Attorney General in obtaining the order and invoke the sanctions provided by Rule
37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.33 Evasion or obstruction of compliance by withholding, concealing or destroying documentary material
that is the subject of an investigative demand is subject to penal sanctions."'
The Attorney General is responsible for the custody, use and
preservation of documentary material made available pursuant to a demand,3" and for its return upon completion of the investigation or in
any event 24 months from the date produced (unless that time period is
extended by court order).3 6 All documentary material, answers to interrogatories, and transcripts of testimony provided or produced are
classified as confidential (subject to court order). They cannot (without a court order) be examined or copied by, or disclosed to, anyone
except an authorized representative of the Attorney General without
the consent of the person furnishing the same; except they may be used
in a grand jury proceeding or, on notice to that person, in the conduct
of any case "or other official proceeding" involving an alleged violation of the Valentine Act.3
29. Id. § 1331.16(G).
30. Id.§ 1331.16(H)(1).
31. Id. § 1331.16(H)(2).
32. Id. § 1331.16(I).
33. Id.§ 1331.16(J).
34. Id. §§ 1331.16(K), .99(A).
35. Id. § 1331.16(L).
36. Id.§ 1331.16(N).
37. Id. § 1331.16(M).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/3
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All public officers and employees are obliged to furnish to the Attorney General, upon request, all information and assistance in their
possession or within their power.3"
II.

PROPRIETY OF THE DEMAND

As a general proposition, notwithstanding the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, 'it
seems
well-established that the sweeping powers conferred by the new Act
upon the Attorney General to pry into private business affairs in a
search for evidence of antitrust law violation, are constitutional. That
is, they are constitutional provided that the proceeding is within the
purview of authority vested in the Attorney General, the nature of the
inquiry under the antitrust laws is made known to the person investigated, and the information demanded is reasonably relevant to the investigation. The leading decision to that effect under the federal act is
In re Gold Bond Stamp Co.3
This is so although, unlike a number of other state investigative demand statutes and the Uniform State Antitrust Act, 0 the Ohio statute,
like the federal, does not require that there be a finding of reasonable
cause to believe that a violation of the antitrust law has occurred
before enforcing an I.D.
The Attorney General is required by the Ohio Act only to have
'reasonable cause to believe" that the person addressed by the demand
has documents or knowledge of any fact "'relevant to any investigation
conducted to determine if any person is or has been engaged in a violation [of the Valentine Act]."'" The demand must describe the conduct
under investigation and state the provisions of law applicable thereto.4 2
Decisions under the federal statute and some state statutes sugjest that
these requirements are not purely rhetorical and that, at least in part
for fourth amendment reasons, if there are grounds upon which to
claim the purpose is improper, then, absent a demonstrable, or at least
sworn to, purpose to further a legitimate antitrust investigation, the
demand may be successfully challenged.
The burden imposed on the Attorney General by this requirement,
however, does not appear to be heavy. In ChattanoogaPharmaceutical
Association v. United States Department of Justice,4' 3 a federal civil investigative demand was challenged on allegations that the demand had
38.
39.
40.

Id. § 1331.16(0).
221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).
UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACr § 6(b).

41.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(B) (Page Supp. 1978).

42.
43.

Id. § 1331.16(C)(1).
358 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1966).
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been instigated by a competitor and had been issued in order to use
governmental pressure to intimidate, harass and use duress on members of the petitioning association to cause them to drop a pending action under the Tennessee Fair Trade Act. The Justice Department
elected not to deny those allegations on the grounds that to do so
might create a harmful precedent for future enforcement of the Act.
The Court thereupon set aside the demand, making these observations:
(a) Absenta substantial challenge to the government's purpose by
the person being investigated, the government's recital of purpose in the
language of the statute would be sufficient.
(b) Once such a challenge was made, however, the court would not
infer from the mere fact the government had issued the demand that the
Attorney General had reason to issue it; something more was required."
That "something more" requirement was held to be satisfied in
American Pharmaceutical Association v. McLaren,"5 in which the
demandee made similar allegations of improper purpose on the government's part, by the simple sworn denial of improper purpose contained in an affidavit filed by the Assistant Attorney General in Charge
of the Antitrust Division, and the further statement contained therein
that he had reason to believe the demandees might be parties to a contract in violation of the antitrust laws. Absent evidence to refute those
affidavits, and granting the government a presumption of regularity
and propriety, the court denied the demandee's effort to inquire into
the possibility that the government's demand was improperly prompted
by or in aid of an inquiry of a legislative or political nature, or instigated by a litigant with interests adverse to it.
Aside from consideration of improper purposes, there may also be
grounds for attacking the demand if the stated purpose is too speculative or conjectural.
In a New York case, Kates v. Lefkowitz,"' the court quashed a subpoena issued by the Attorney General in support of an investigation,
under New York's antitrust statute,"7 of refusals by a number of landlords to rent to blacks. Agreeing that concerted refusals by landlords
to lease to blacks could violate the Act, and notwithstanding the Attorney General's extremely broad statutory authority to conduct investigations into possible violations of law, the court nonetheless refused to
permit the state attorney general to seek evidence upon conjecture
alone, stating:
44. Id. at 866.

45. 344 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1972).
46.

47.

28 Misc. 2d 210, 216 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sp. Term N.Y. County Ct. 1961).
Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 1968).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/3
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[T]here must be some reasonable ground for the belief that such
evidence [of violation of the state antitrust law] is obtainable. Otherwise,
the inquiry is a roving and fishing expedition which constitutes an invasion of the fundamental right of an individual under our law to be free
from the compulsory process of government unless there be present such
facts and circumstances as, when developed, would warrant an implication of wrongdoing on his part.4"
The Attorney General's statement that a number of landlords refused
to lease to blacks and that this might result from an agreement among
them was held not to be sufficient to sustain his burden under the New
York statute. 9
If counsel has reason to believe that a demand has been issued for
purposes other than a bona fide civil investigation into a possible violation of the Valentine Act, a challenge to the demand as improperly
issued should be considered. It may even be possible to get discovery in
support of allegations of such impropriety. In one unreported Ohio
federal case, In re Cleveland Trust Co. ,SO notwithstanding the submission of an affidavit by the government asserting that the investigation
had been independently decided upon, the court permitted the
demandee to inquire as to whether the investigation was either in aid of
a legislative or political inquiry or some other improper purpose.
The possibility of misuse under the Ohio Act is not fanciful. In the
first place, the decision to issue the demand need not be made by the
Attorney General himself, or by any Assistant Attorney General; it
may be issued by a "designated representative," 5' whose judgment and
motives may be more subject to criticism than those of the principal
officers of the Attorney General's office.
Moreover, the Attorney Genei al himself may have it in mind to use
the demand to assist him in performing functions of his office other
than enforcing the Valentine Act. A statement, furnished to the Ohio
House Judiciary Committee by the Antitrust Division of the Attorney
General's Office in June, 1977, in support of H.B. 410 (the bill which
became the new Act), specifically referred to the new provisions of
federal antitrust law which authorize the bringing of parenspatriaeactions by state attorneys general on behalf of consumers. In urging
enactment of the bill to grant him broad powers of investigation under
the Valentine Act, the Attorney General contended, referring to his
48. 28 Misc. 2d at 216, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
49. Id. at 216, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.
50. No. C-68855 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 1969). This case was referred to in In re
Emprise Corp., 344 F. Supp. 319, 322 (W.D.N.Y. 1972), in which a like effort to serve
interrogatories on the government was denied.
51. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
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new status under federal law, as follows: "This responsibility recently
placed on the shoulders of the state Attorneys General makes of even
greater public significance their ability to effectively investigate and
prosecute antitrust violators." 5 2 It is submitted that use of section
1331.16 of the Ohio Revised Code to assist in the bringing of parens
patriae actions under federal law would be improper. It is also submitted that, notwithstanding (a) the absence of an express statutory requirement that an I.D. may be used only prior to commencement of an
action,53 (b) statutory permission to use evidence procured by the use
of an I.D. before a grand jury, 4 and (c) the exception to the rule of
confidentiality contained in the statute which permits use of information and documents obtained through an I.D. "in the conduct of any
violation, ' 5 6
case55 or other official proceeding involving an alleged
use of an I.D. for any of the following purposes would be improper
and should not be permitted, namely:
(i) in aid of, or for the purpose of bringing, a criminal proceeding, on the grounds that the Act applies, according to its title, only
to "civil antitrust investigations" and that criminal investigations
should be conducted subject to the procedures and protections afforded by the grand jury process;
(ii) in aid of a pending civil action brought by the Attorney
General, on the grounds that the discovery proceedings provided by
the Rules of Civil Procedure are more than adequate for the Attorney
General to obtain evidence and at the same time provide essential protections for the defendant;"
(iii) in aid of an action brought or to be brought under the
Valentine Act to which the State of Ohio is not and will not be a party,
on the grounds that the statute was not intended to provide new
52. Statement of the Attorney General's Antitrust Division provided to the House
Judiciary Committee in June, 1977, in support of H.B. 410.
53.

Cf UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT § 6(a). The Uniform State Antitrust Act

states that the investigative demand may be served "before bringing any action in the
district court . . . ." Id.
54. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(R) (Page Supp. 1978).
55. The new statute's use of the word "case" itself raises an interesting problem
of construction. Ohio Civil Rule 2 provides, "There shall be only one form of action,
and it shall be known as a civil action"; whereas the Criminal Rules use the words "action" (OHIO R. CRIM. P. 1, 55(A), 59) and "case" (OHIO R. CRIM. P. 4.1, 50) inter-

changeably. Quaere whether use of the word "case" in division M of section 1331.16
of the Ohio Revised Code civil investigative demand statute refers only to criminal
proceedings.
56.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(M) (Page Supp. 1978).

57. E.g., the right to notice of, and to participate in, discovery proceedings involving third parties, a right not available to the target of an investigation under the
new Act. OHIO R. Civ. P. 26.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/3
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avenues to antitrust litigation for anyone except the Attorney General
acting on behalf of the State."
Moreover, the new Act permits the issuance of a demand only for
discovery relevant to an investigation conducted to determine if any
person "is or has been engaged in a violation."" Prospective violations may not be inquired into, and any demand issued regarding plans
or future activities of any kind would seem to be clearly improper."'
III.

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION.

(a)

Who is a "person"?

The "person" upon whom a demand may be served is not limited
to the target of the Attorney General's investigation, nor need the person under investigation be identified in the demand. 6 ' However, there
is an unfortunate ambiguity in the Act's definition of "person." Section 1331.01(A) of the Valentine Act has long provided that, as used in
sections 1331.01 to 1331.14 Ohio Revised Code, " '[pierson' includes
corporations, partnerships, and associations existing under or authorized by any state or territory of the United States . . . ." While the
words "natural person" do not appear in that clause, its grammatical
construction permits the inference that the draftsman used "person"
elsewhere in the Valentine Act in its ordinary sense, i.e., to mean a
natural person, and the clause referred to simply amplified use of the
term to "include" the legal entities mentioned.
Instead of amending section 1331.01(A) to apply the same inference to use of the word "person" in section 1331.16 as in sections
1331.01 to 1331.14, however, the new statute uses the word "person,"
"as defined in section 1331.01 of the Revised Code." 6' 2 If section
58.

In that connection, section 1331.16(M) of the Act permits use of material fur-

nished, on notice to the person providing the same, "in the conduct of any case or
other official proceeding involving an alleged violation of this chapter." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1331.16(M) (Page Supp. 1978). The reference to "official proceeding"
should be read as meaning a proceeding brought on behalf of or in the interest of the
state; read backwards into the word "case" (which seems to be required by use of the
"other"), this would appear to limit use of the material to actions brought by, or in
the interest of, the state, and perhaps only to crinrinal actions. See note 57 supra.
59. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(B) (Page Supp. 1978). The General
Assembly struck the Attorney General's proposed language, "or is preparing to
engage," from the bill. H.B. 410, 112th G.A., Reg. Sess. (1977).
60. The federal act is likewise limited to past or present violations except in
merger cases. 15 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). The Valentine Act does not in terms deal

with mergers or incipient restraints.
61. Contrary language originally contained in TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
33,801.16(c)(1) has been corrected. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 329, April 17, 1978.
62. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(B) (Page Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
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1331.01 must be read as a definition, and not as a meaning-expander,
the word "person" is not thereby defined to mean a natural person; it
would seem to mean only the entities named. There is ground for argument, therefore, that the Act does not authorize the service of an I.D.
on a natural person.
That such usage is not arbitrary is supported by the original federal
act, which defined the term "person" to mean "any corporation, association, partnership, or other legal entity not a naturalperson. '63
(b) Foreign entities.
There is another curious consequence of the draftsman's reference
to section 1331.01(A) for a definition of "person": entities organized
under foreign law, although otherwise within Ohio's jurisdiction, are
apparently excluded from the scope of the Act.6 Only entities organized under the laws of any state or territory of the United States are
subject to the investigative demand powers of the Attorney General.
Another example of the Ohio Act's inapt phraseology, this time
clearly resulting from uncritical copying of the same language in the
federal act, 65 appears in the reference to a person believed by the Attorney General to be "in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material."6 One may have custody of documents, but to be
in custody of documents reverses the meaning, and makes the documents master of the person. Compare Ohio Civil Rule 34, which
speaks of documents and things "in the possession, custody or control" of the party served with a request to produce.
(c)

"Designated representative" and "custodian."

Counsel will want to check the identity of the person who signed
the I.D. served on his client. In particular, it may be of some impor63. P.L. No. 87-644, § 2(f), 76 Stat. 548 (1962) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
131 1(f) (1976)) (emphasis added). The amended federal act, by way of contrast, defines
"person" to mean "any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, including any person acting under color or authority of State law."
15 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (1976).
64. Prior to 1976, the meaning of the word "person" contained in section
1331.01 included "corporations, partnerships, and associations existing under or
authorized by any state or territory of the United States, or a foreign country." OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(A) (Page 1962) (emphasis added). In that year, however,
the Valentine Act was amended to prohibit "trusts" formed for the purpose of refusing to trade with persons blacklisted or boycotted by any foreign corporate or governmental entity. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.01(A) (Page Supp. 1977). At the same
time the reference to foreign legal entities was deleted from the definition of "person"
(except that, solely for purposes of the definition of a trust in section 1331.01(B), the
word "person" was deemed to include "a foreign governmental entity"). Id.
Therefore the new civil investigative demand act applies only to domestic entities.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976).
66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(B) (Page Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/3
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tance to ascertain whether or not the signer is an Assistant Attorney
General or otherwise an employee of the office of the Attorney General.
This is so for the following reasons: a "designated representative"
of the Attorney General is authorized, under the new Act, to issue an
I.D. 67 and to take other action looking toward its enforcement. 68 The
Act contains no hint as to who the designated representative may be,
how he is designated, what evidence of designation one may reasonably expect him to produce, what oaths of office he is required to take,
or what standards of conduct he is to be held to.69 At the outset, it
would seem that counsel is entitled to know with whom he is dealing.
The "designated representative" is not in terms referred to in the
confidentiality section of the Act.70 The Act says that the materials,
answers, and testimony furnished shall not be disclosed, except as
otherwise provided.7 1 That provision, although in the passive mode,
may be sufficient to bind everyone in the world (including the "designated representative") to secrecy. However, the command is explicit as
to one class of persons: "No employee of the office of the attorney
general shall purposely make available for examination or copying
documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony provided pursuant to an investigative demand,
72
nor disclose the contents thereof, except as provided by this section."
Since only employees of the Attorney General's office are under a
specific prohibition, and since that prohibition has been qualified to
cover only "purposeful" disclosure (as compared with the absolute
prohibition contained in the preceding passive sentence), it may be
argued that only those employees, and no others, are subject to penalty
for violation of the confidentiality clause.
If the "designated representative" is, in fact, an employee of the
Attorney General's office, e.g., an Assistant Attorney General, there
67.

Id.

68. I.e., identify the documentary custodian (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1331.16(C)(2)(e) (Page Supp. 1978)); receive answers to interrogatories (id. §
1331.16(C)(3)(a)); take oral testimony (id. § 1331.16(C)(4)(b)); file a written request in a
court of common pleas to extend transactional immunity to the person served in exchange for compelling discovery notwithstanding assertion of his privilege against selfincrimination (id.§ 1331.16(H)); and require other public officers to furnish all
assistance (id.
§ 1331.16(0)).
69. The federal act requires the designee to be an "antitrust investigator," i.e., an
attorney or investigator employed by the Department of Justice who is charged with
the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect any antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(a)
(1976).
70. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(M) (Page Supp. 1978).
71.

Id.

72.

Id.
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would seem to be no difficulty. If, however, the "designated representative" is not such an employee, 3 it would seem to be prudent for
counsel to seek a court order either setting aside the I.D. on the
grounds that his client may be denied the confidentiality and other
protections attaching to the Attorney General and his employees; or
requiring the Attorney General to substitute one of his employees as
his designated representative; or enjoining the non-employee
designated representative (and all his non-employee associates and
assistants) to secrecy."
What has been said here of the representative is equally true of the
custodian to whom the client's private papers are to be made available. 5 Counsel will want to consider like safeguards, notwithstanding
the sweeping imposition on the Attorney General of responsibility for
the custody, use, preservation and return of documentary materials
furnished pursuant to an I.D."6
(d)

"Service" of the demand.

The demand may be issued and caused to be served by the Attorney General or his designated representative "upon any person or the
representative or agent of the person." 7 There is no definition of
''representative" or "agent," an unnecessary and inconvenient omission which can only give rise to ambiguity and dispute. Compare, in
that connection, the provisions of Ohio Civil Rule 4.2, which spell out
with particularity how service can be made otherwise than on the person sought to be served."
Compare, also, the federal act, which provides separately for service upon a natural person (who cannot be served through a representative or agent) 9 and upon a legal entity (which can be served by
delivery of the demand to persons authorized to act for it, or by
delivery to its principal office, or by mail to its principal office).8 0 In
73. Suppose, for example, that he represents the plaintiff in a pending or
threatened antitrust action against the demandee.
74. See In re S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 30 N.C. App. 587, 227 S.E.2d 645 (1976), in
which a protective order was issued notwithstanding the absence of any showing that
the Attorney General would otherwise disclose the information in question.
75. The federal act requires that the custodian be an "antitrust investigator" (15
U.S.C. §§ 1311(h), 1313(a) (1976)), by definition an employee of the Department of
Justice (id. § 1311 (e)).
76.

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(L) (Page Supp. 1978).

77. Id. § 1331.16(B).
78. For example, service upon a corporation may be made by serving "the agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process" or "by serving an
officer or a managing or general agent of the corporation." OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.2(7).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(e)(2) (1976).
80. Id. § 1312(e)(1).
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the interest of assuring a reasonable likelihood of actual notice, essential to satisfy the requirements of due process, the courts should interpret "representative or agent" as used in the Ohio investigative demand
statute to mean someone falling within the categories of authorized
persons identified in the Civil Rules.
Service of the demand under the Ohio Act is "complete" upon
either (1) depositing a copy in the mails, by certified mail, addressed to
the person to be served at his principal office, place of business, or
residence; or (2) delivering a copy to the person, or the representative
or agent of the person.8 1
The Act does not specify who may make delivery or mail the demand, nor does it require that the certified mail letter be received or
that proof of service be obtained. Literally, therefore, the demandee
may be in default of the "compliance date" specified in the demand,
may lose his right to file, within twenty days after service, a request to
modify or set it aside, and may be subject to an enforcement proceeding brought by the Attorney General,8 2 all without ever actually receiving notice of the demand at all.
By way of contrast, the Civil Rules 3 and the federal act 8" both contain careful and detailed provisions to assure that the person to be
served receives actual notice and that the requirements of due process
are met. The Uniform State Antitrust Act simply provides that an investigative demand be served "in the manner required for service of
process in this State."8 " Either method would have been satisfactory,
but the Ohio Act has somehow fallen between, with regrettable consequences.
It may be suggested that failure to give the demandee actual notice
does no harm since he is not subject to sanctions until the Attorney
6
General has obtained an order requiring him to produce or testify.'
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
82. Id. § 1331.16(I)-(J).
83. Ohio Civil Rule 4.1(1) describes the required mailing procedure step-by-step
and prescribes a return receipt to prove service; Rule 4.1(2) provides for personal service to be made by a court officer or an adult designated by court order and prescribes
a return of service; Rule 4.1(3) provides for residence service and prescribes the same
procedure for return of service.
84. The federal act provides that service may be made by an "antitrust investigator" (who must be an employee of the Department of Justice) or by a United
States marshal or deputy marshal, or outside the United States as provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(d) (1976). Mail service must be by
certified mail, return receipt requested, (id. § 1312(e)(1)(C), (2)(B)), and a verified
return must be made to prove service, accompanied, in the case of mail service, by the
return post office receipt of delivery (id. § 1312(f)).
85. UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST Acr § 6(a)(l).
86. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(J) (Page Supp. 1978).
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There are at least two difficulties with that suggestion: first, that the
right of the demandee to move to modify or set aside the demand, 87 including the right to seek additional time for compliance, is a valuable
one; and second, that if service of the demand is complete without
assurance of actual notice (or a due process equivalent), then service of
the Attorney General's request for a court order compelling compliance8 8 is also arguably complete without such assurance, permitting the
court to enforce the demand and impose penalties without notice to
the demandee.
Such a result would clearly offend the requirements of due process.
It is submitted that, notwithstanding the spare requirements for accomplishing service set forth in the new Act, 8" the court should require
the Attorney General, as a prerequisite to seeking enforcement of the
demand, to establish proof of service of the demand, as well as of his
request for an order compelling compliance, in substantially the form
and manner prescribed by the Civil Rules.
IV.
(a)

FORM AND CONTENTS OF THE

I.D.

Conduct under investigation.

Decisions under the federal act and other state statutes are to the
effect that the required description of the conduct under investigation
and statement of applicable law" are easily satisfied."' The Attorney
General is spared the necessity for giving particulars on the ground
that he is himself looking for them.' 2
(b) Documentary material.
"Documentary material" is the only term which the new Ohio Act
purports to define. It means
the original or any copy of any writings, drawings, graphs, charts,

photographs, phonorecords, and other data compilation from which intelligence, relevant to any investigation conducted to determine if any
person is or has been engaged in a violation of this chapter, can be
perceived with or without the use of detection devices. 9"
87. Id. § 1331.16(I).
88. Id. § 1331.16(J).
89. Id. § 1331.16(E).
90. Id. § 1331.16(C)(1).
91. In re Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd 325
F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964); Hyster Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964);
Material Handling Inst., Inc. v. McLaren, 426 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1970); Lewandowski v.
Danforth, 547 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1977); Steele v. Gorton, 85 Wash. 2d 585, 537 P.2d
782 (1975).
92. In re Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. at 397.
93. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(A) (Page Supp. 1978). The definition is
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The following observations may be made:
(i) Things, as distinguished from documents and other "data
compilation" materials, are not subject to compulsory production
94
under the Act.
(ii) Documents and like materials which do not contain information relevant to a Valentine Act investigation are not "documentary
materials" subject to the Act.
The I.D. must describe the documentary material to be produced
"with reasonable particularity," 9 5 prescribe a return date that will provide a reasonable period of time within which to assemble the material
and make it available for inspection and copying or reproduction,96
and identify the custodian to whom it is to be made available. 97
The Act does not, therefore, permit the Attorney General to require that any documents be turned over to him or to his custodian;
they are merely to be assembled and made available for copying. 9 The
Act does not say where they are to be assembled and made available or
how the Attorney General's copying is to be accomplished.
The federal act specifies that the documentary material is to be
made available at the principal place of business of the person served
(or such other place as he and the custodian may agree or as the court
may direct) and that, on agreement with the custodian, the person
served may substitute copies for originals. 99
It would seem that compliance is complete under the Ohio Act
upon tendering the documents to the custodian at the principal place
drawn from Ohio Civil Rule 34(a)(1). The federal act limits the definition of
"documentary material" to "any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, communication, tabulation, chart, or other document." 15 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (1976).
94. Compare the UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT § 6(a) which refers to a "document or other tangible object." Compare also FED. R. Civ. P. 34(A)(2), (3) which extends discovery in civil actions to "tangible things" and affords the right to enter upon
land.
95. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(C)(2)(a) (Page Supp. 1978). The quoted
language is taken from Ohio Civil Rule 34(B); omitted is language from the rule to the
effect that the request for production shall set forth the items to be inspected "either
by individual item or by category."
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(C)(2)(b) (Page Supp. 1978).
97. Id. § 1331.16(C)(2)(c).
98. The reason for use of the synonyms "copying" and "reproduction" as alternatives, which seems to have been taken from the federal act (15 U.S.C. §
1312(b)(2)(B) (1976)), is not clear. The Ohio Act's provision for return of the
documents, however, makes it clear that original documents are not to be turned over
to the Attorney General or his designated representative. It states, "[w]hen copies of
documentary material made available pursuant to an investigative demand are no
longer required . . . all copies of the material shall be returned." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1331.16(N) (Page Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1976).
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of business of the person served (perhaps the office at which the demand was served). It is then up to the custodian to make suitable
arrangements for copying equipment at that location, at the Attorney
General's expense. This has the virtue of tending to limit the otherwise
voracious appetite of the custodian for copies of everything made
available, regardless of relevance.
The problem then may be how to know which documents the Attorney General has copied, so that a duplicate set may be made up for
defense counsel. If the copying is being done at the office of the person
served (perhaps on the latter's copying equipment, at the expense of
the Attorney General), this can easily be arranged.
A question may arise when the material demanded is machinereadable only, and the Attorney General lacks machine-reading
capability. The Act does not require the demandee to interpret, or to
reduce to hard copy, machine-readable material; but such information
and assistance could be obtained, perhaps with difficulty, by propounding written interrogatories or by taking oral testimony.
The Ohio Act does not prescribe any formalities for effecting production of documentary material. The discovery provisions of the Civil
Rules, which may be applicable under section 1331.16(G), do not ap0 No
pear to be helpful in the context of an investigative demand.'
statement or representation appears to be called for in that connection.
By way of contrast, the federal act requires the production of documentary material in response to a demand to be made "under a sworn
certificate . . .to the effect that all of the documentary material required by the demand and in the possession, custody, or control of the
person to whom the demand is directed has been produced and made
available to the custodian."''
Section 1331.16(L) of the Ohio Act charges the Attorney General
with responsibility for the sakekeeping of the documentary materials
made available pursuant to a demand, and for their return. Since orig100.

OHIO R. Civ. P. 34(B) provides, in part:

The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written response within a
period designated in the request, not less than twenty-eight days after the service
thereof or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. The response
shall state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested, unless it is objected to, in which event the
reasons for objections shall be stated. If objection is made to part of an item or
category, the part shall be specified.
The new Act requires, as an alternative to full compliance, the filing within 20 days
after service (or such lesser time as the demand may allow) of a request for an order
modifying or setting aside the demand, specifying each reason therefor. OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 1331.16(l) (Page Supp. 1978). This is inconsistent with the procedure
spelled out in Rule 34(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(g) (1976).
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inal materials are not required to be turned over to him or his custodian, however, this may properly be construed to refer to copies made
by him, or at his order, in accordance with the explicit provisions requiring return of "copies" of the documentary material to the person
served.10 2
Reference has already been made to problems incident to the identification, qualifications, and obligations of the custodian to whom
documentary material is to be made available.10 3
(c)

Interrogatories.

The statute says nothing of the standards applicable to the Attorney General's interrogatories, or even that the interrogatories must be
contained in the demand, but merely requires that the I.D. identify the
representative of the Attorney General to whom the answers are to be
made and prescribe the date by which they are to be presented.1'0
By way of contrast, the federal act also requires a civil investigative
demand (C.I.D.) to "propound with definiteness and certainty the
written interrogatories to be answered,"' 0 5 and the Uniform State
Antitrust Act"6 specifies that the demand must contain a copy of the
interrogatories. No doubt Ohio I.D.s will, in practice, incorporate the
text of the written interrogatories required to be answered.
The Ohio Act directs that "the taking of oral testimony, answering
of written interrogatories, and production of documentary material
S. . , except as otherwise provided in this section, shall follow the procedures established by the discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil
Procedure."'' 0 7 While in terms this applies the Civil Rules only to
answering the interrogatories and producing the documentary materials, and not to propounding the one and demanding the other, this
appears to be a drafting inadvertence, since the same sentence applies
the same procedures to the taking of oral testimony, and does not
mention the giving of oral testimony. Presumably the intention is that
the Civil Rules on discovery are to govern-Civil Rule 33 in the case of
written interrogatories-and that case law r-lating to the proper form
of interrogatories is likewise applicable.
Ohio Civil Rule 33(A) requires that at least 28 days be allowed for
answering interrogatories (unless changed by court order); however,
102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(C)(3) (Page Supp. 1978).
103. See text of section III, supra.
104. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(C)(3) (Page Supp. 1978). The Ohio Act calls
for a single date for all answers to written interrogatories. The federal act contemplates
that several dates may be specified in the demand. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(3)(B) (1976).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(3)(A) (1976).
106. Section 6(a)(4).
107. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
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section 1331.16(C)(3) of the Act imposes no minimum time periods on
the Attorney General, and section 1331.16(I) suggests it may be less
than 20 days. It seems clear that the court can extend the time if it appears to be unreasonable.
Ohio Civil Rule 33(D) requires that interrogatories be arranged
with at least one inch of space after each interrogatory to permit
answers or objections to be typed in, and the same procedure should
be applicable to written interrogatories incorporated in investigative
demands.
Ohio Civil Rule 33(A) requires that each interrogatory be answered
"separately and fully under oath, unless it is objected to, in which
event the reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer. The
answers are to be signed by the person making them, and the objec0 8 Following this protions signed by the attorney making them."'
cedure for objections, in the case of an investigative demand, may,
however, open the door to a request by the Attorney General for an
order of enforcement, perhaps seeking sanctions for failure to comply.
The safe procedure would seem to require filing and serving a request
for an order modifying or setting aside the demand, specifying each
ground relied on, and thereby tolling the time allowed for compliance
with the demand.
Ohio Civil Rule 33(C) permits the party served to tender an examination of business records in lieu of answering interrogatories when the
task of deriving the information sought is substantially the same for
the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served. It would appear that this Civil Rule is applicable in the case of written interrogatories incorporated in an I.D.
The Ohio Act does not provide for the safekeeping, by a custodian
or otherwise, of answers to written interrogatories, or for their return
to the person furnishing them. It may seem appropriate, in a particular
case, for the demandee to request an order applying the provisions applicable to the safekeeping and return of documentary material"' to
0
interrogatory answers, as is the case under the federal act." ,
108. The federal act prescribes, in substance, the procedure set forth in Civil Rule
33(A), i.e., that the demandee answer each interrogatory
separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event
the reason for the objection shall be submitted under a sworn certificate ...to the
effect that all information required by the demand and in the possession, custody,
control or knowledge of the person to whom the demand is directed has been
submitted.
15 U.S.C. § 1312(h) (1976).
109. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 133 l.16(C)(2) (Page Supp. 1978).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
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(d) Oral testimony.
The Ohio Act requires that an I.D. for the taking of oral testimony
prescribe a date, time and place and identify the representative of the
Attorney General who shall conduct the examination."' The person
served may be "represented by counsel" at the taking of that person's
testimony.'' 2 The discovery provisions of the Civil Rules govern the
procedures to be followed." 3
Of all the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure relating to discovery, that
prescribing deposition procedures (Rule 30) is the most detailed. The
examination is to be taken before a person authorized to administer
any oath (Rule 28); the witness will be sworn by that officer and the
testimony (and any and all objections) are to be recorded by the officer
or under his supervision;"' the witness may move to terminate or limit
the examination upon a showing that it is being conducted "in bad
faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent" and, upon the latter's demand, the taking of the
deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make the
motion." 5 When fully transcribed, the deposition shall be submitted to
the witness for examination (unless waived), any changes desired shall
be made with a statement of reasons for the change, and the deposition
shall be signed by the witness (unless waived or the witness is ill or
refuses to sign, in which case a certification of the facts by the officer
will validate the transcript for use)." 6 There are also provisions for
transcription and filing of the deposition, and an explicit requirement
that the officer furnish a copy to the deponent upon payment there117
for.
There are also ancillary provisions in the Ohio Civil Rules covering
such matters as prohibiting the use of a deposition against a party who
was unable through the exercise of diligence to obtain counsel to represent him '" and providing penalties for failure of the person noticing a
deposition to attend.'9
111.

OHio REV. CODE ANN.

§ 1331.16(C)(4) (Page Supp. 1978).

112. Id. § 1331.16(F). The federal act spells out in great detail the role counsel for
the demandee may play, apparently based on considerations appropriate to a congressional investigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(7)(A) (1976). It also specifies, for example,
that the antitrust investigator conducting the examination shall exclude all persons except the person being examined, his counsel, the officer before whom the testimony is
to be taken, and any stenographer taking the testimony. Id. § 1312(i)(l)-(2). There is
no like provision in the Ohio Act.
113.

114.
115.

OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(G) (Page Supp. 1978).
R. Civ. P. 30(C).

'OHIO

Id.30(D).

116. Id. 30(E).

117.

Id.30(F).

118. Id. 30(B)(2).
119. Id. 30(G)(1).
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Again there is room for argument as to whether those provisions
apply to the taking of oral testimony by the Attorney General pursuant
to an investigative demand. On the one hand, section 1331.16(G) says
that the discovery procedures of the Civil Rules apply "in all
respects," qualified by the phrase, "except as otherwise provided in
this section," i.e., in the investigative demand act. On the other hand,
those procedures are declared to be applicable only to "the taking of
oral testimony," and the Attorney General may urge that he is free to
disregard any procedures specified in the Civil Rules which are not
directly related to swearing the witness and requiring answers to questions. It has been suggested by a representative of the Attorney General, for example, that the transcript of examination may not be made
available to the witness, in order to preserve the confidentiality of the
proceeding.'1°
It would appear that that is far too restrictive a view, and that,
except to the extent that the provisions of Civil Rule 30 are clearly
designed only to protect the rights of parties to a litigation in respect of
the deposition of a non-party witness, e.g., permitting cross-examination of the witness by the other party,' 2 ' those provisions should
govern the Attorney General's examinations. If the Attorney General
is not prepared to agree, for example, that the witness may review and
correct his deposition, and obtain a copy, an application for an order
to that effect should be considered.
The 20-day or shorter limitation on applications for orders to set
aside or modify investigative demands' 2 should be kept in mind in that
connection. That limitation is obviously not applicable to objections
arising during the taking of the deposition or to the witness's right to
suspend the examination pending the filing of a motion to terminate or
modify the scope of the examination under Civil Rule 30(D), since
such objections could not have been made prior to the occurrence of
the conduct or events objected to on the taking of oral testimony.
As in the case of answers to written interrogatories, the Ohio Act
does not provide for safekeeping of the transcript by a "custodian,"
or by anyone else."' The Attorney General's responsibility is expressly
120. Address by Gene McShane to the Antitrust Section of the Ohio State Bar
Association (May 5, 1978). The federal act expressly provides for the right of the person examined, or his counsel, to examine the transcript of his oral testimony, 15
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4)(B) (1976), and to obtain a copy as well, unless the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, for good cause limits the witness
to inspection of the official transcript. Id. § 1312(i)(6).
121. OHIo R. Civ. P. 30(C).
122.

OHIo REV. CODE ANN.

§ 1331.16(I) (Page Supp. 1978).

123. By way of contrast, the federal act not only requires that the transcript be
kept by the official custodian, 15 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1976), but also contains
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/3
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limited to the preservation, use, and return of "documentary material.""'2 No one, therefore, is charged by statute with responsibility for
looking after the transcript, or returning it, and the witness has no
assurance of being able to locate it. A motion for a protective order
would seem to be worth consideration.
Finally, unlike the federal act,' 25 the Ohio Act makes no provision
for the payment of witness fees or mileage.' 2 6 This, too, may properly
be the subject of interpretive litigation.
(e) Exclusions; Immunity.
The Ohio Act declares that no investigative demand shall contain
any requirement that would be unreasonable or require any testimony
or production that would be privileged from disclosure if contained in
a grand jury subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.' 27 The insubstantiality of the limitation thus imposed on the Attorney General's roving
commission should be further restricted by the limitation contained in
section 1331.16(B), that the Attorney General may issue a demand
only when he has reasonable cause to believe that any person may have
knowledge of any fact relevant to an antitrust investigation., 2 It would
appear, therefore, that only facts may be sought by the demand, and
not hearsay, opinion, or speculation.
An exception is carved out of the prohibition against requiring the
production of privileged information where (a) the person refuses to
testify or make production based on a claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination, (b) the Attorney General (or his designated representative) requests an appropriate common pleas court to require testimony or production notwithstanding the claim, and (c) the person
served is afforded transactional immunity by the court.' 2 9
elaborate procedures to assure the appointment of successor custodians and due notice
to the person examined of such substitutions. Id. § 1313(0.
124. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(L) (Page Supp. 1978).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(8) (1976).
126. Compare OHIO CRIM. R. 17(D).
127. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(D) (Page Supp. 1978). The federal act also
tests the propriety of the disclosure demanded by the standards of a grand jury subpoena and adds the standards applicable to discovery requests under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, "to the extent that the application of such standards to any such
demand is appropriate and consistent with the provisions and purposes of this
chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 1312(c) (1976).
128. The federal act permits issuance of a civil investigative demand whenever the
Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
has reason to believe that any person may have any "information," 15 U.S.C. §
1312(a), a looser term than "fact."
129. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(H) (Page Supp. 1978). The Valentine Act
contains two separate sections affording immunity to witnesses, that referred to in the
text, and section 1331.13 which provides for compelled testimony, notwithstanding
Published by eCommons,

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

Again there is a conceptual difficulty with the draftsmanship of the
statute. If, as section 1331.16(D) provides, in substance, it is improper
for an investigative demand to require testimony as to privileged matters or the production of privileged information or material, then there
is no occasion for the person served to refuse to testify or make production by reason of his privilege against self-incrimination: the demand itself is improper. If there is no assertion of the privilege, there is
no way to trigger the immunization procedure provided for in section
1331.16(H). The witness may simply disregard so much of the I.D. as
calls for the privileged testimony or production or, at most, move to
set the I.D. aside or modify it as improper under section 1331.16(D).
V.

OBJECTION TO AND ENFORCEMENT OF AN I.D.

(a) Choice of court.
"Requests" for orders to modify, set aside, or enforce investigative
demands are to be made to
the court of common pleas in the county in which he [the person served]
resides, transacts business, or is otherwise found . . . except that if the
person transacts business in more than one county, the request 'shall be
filed in the county in which the person maintains his principal place of
business, or in any other county that may be agreed upon by the person
and the attorney general, or his designated representative.' 30
This language, apparently drawn from the Clayton Act,' 3 ' seems to
give the requesting party considerable leeway in choosing a place to
sue. The person served can presumably arrange to be "found" in any
of Ohio's 88 counties; that is, the act of filing a request for an order
modifying or setting aside an I.D. would seem to be enough in itself to
give the court where filed jurisdiction both of the matter and of the
Attorney General.
The Attorney General (or his designated representative), on the
other hand, has less flexibility in choosing a court within which to seek
an enforcement order, since it is the person served who must be
"found" in a county to support venue there. Nonetheless, the
Attorney General may choose any one of several bases for proper
venue: the demandee's county of residence, any county where he transacts business, or where he is "found."
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, in any action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, brought by the Attorney General or any prosecuting attorney for violation
of sections 1331.01 to 1331.14, inclusive.
130. Id. § 1331.16(I)-(J).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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The only exception to this flexible arrangement (other than the
right of the parties to agree on a place for suit) is when the person served
transacts business in more than one county. In such a case, the person
served may file his request only in the county where his principal place
of business is located and the Attorney General (or his designated
representative) may seek an order of enforcement only in that
county.' No reason is suggested for so limiting the choice of counties
available to the person served who happens to be doing business in
more than one county, or for so favoring the multi-county demandee
over other demandees in an enforcement proceeding. This anomaly of
draftsmanship produces a puzzle in the case of; for example, a corporation headquartered in New York which transacts business in
Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati. Since it transacts business in
more than one county, it may sue and be sued only in the county where
it maintains its "principal place of business," and its principal place of
business is not in Ohio.
(b)

Request to set aside or modify.

Section 1331.16(I) of the Ohio Act provides the person served an
opportunity to request an order setting aside or modifying an I.D., but
only if he files his request "within twenty days after service of an investigative demand . . . or at any time before the compliance date
specified in the demand, whichever period is shorter." The request, or
application must "specify each ground upon which the person relies in
seeking relief."
In the usual case, counsel for the person served and the Attorney
General (or his designated representative) will want to try to accommodate each other's I.D. problems, where possible, by agreement. The
peremptory time provisions contained in the statute may, however, be
construed to be jurisdictional, and not subject to waiver or extension
by agreement with the Attorney General.' Therefore the only safe
procedure for the person served would seem to be to file a pro forma
request for an order in all cases, specifying all available grounds, and
requesting such relief (including extensions of time for compliance) as
may be appropriate. Negotiations with the Attorney General may then
take place under a stipulation deferring court action on the
application.
132. There is no similar provision in the federal act. 15 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976).
133. The federal act avoids this jurisdictional cul de sac by permitting the person
served to challenge the demand "within such period exceeding twenty days after service or in excess of such return date as may be prescribed in writing, subsequent to service, by any antitrust investigator named in the demand." 15 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976).
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It is suggested that such an application be filed as promptly as
possible after service of the demand. This is necessary to preserve as
much of the original time for compliance as possible in the event that
no time extension is agreed to by the Attorney General or ordered by
the court. Section 1331.16(1) provides only that "the time allowed for
compliance with the demand shall be tolled during the pendency of the
request in court." If the court denies relief, the tolling ceases and the
3
clock, which started to run upon "service," as defined in the Act, "
picks up where it left off, instead of starting all over again.
In counting time, it must also be remembered that "service," as
defined in the section last cited, is complete upon mailing, without the
necessity for proving receipt, and the date of mailing may not always
be ascertainable by the person served.
The statute imposes no penalties in connection with the filing of a
request to modify or set aside an investigative demand, even if the request is subsequently denied, for whatever reason.' 35 In the event of
noncompliance, however, followed by a request for an order of enforcement, if the court finds that the noncompliance was in bad faith
13 6
or for the purpose of delay, penalties and sanctions may be imposed.
Finally, under the procedures established by the Ohio Act, the
Attorney General may not seek an order of enforcement until there has
37
been a failure of compliance with an investigative demand.'
Therefore as long as a request, timely filed by the person served, is
pending, there would seem to be no basis upon which to obtain an
order of enforcement.
(c)

Enforcement.

The Attorney General, but not his designated representative, may
seek an enforcement order
[w]henever any person fails to fully comply with an investigative demand... [i]f the Court finds that the noncompliance was in bad faith or
for the purpose of delay, it may order the person to pay to the Attorney
General the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, inthe sanctions provided by Rule
cluding attorneys' fees, and may invoke
38
37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
135. The Ohio procedure for objecting to the demand has the virtue, from the
defense point of view, of postponing the time for response to the entire demand, even
though it may not, all be objected to. The federal act requires the person served to comply with any portion of the demand not objected to. 15 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976).
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.16(J) (Page Supp. 1978).
137. Id.
138. Id.
134.
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There is no like penalty imposable on the Attorney General, or his
designated representative, if it turns out that his demand was improper
and that unnecessary expense was caused the person served. 3 9
Reference to the sanctions provided by Ohio Rule 37 is inapt. Rule
37(B), entitled "Failure to comply with order [compelling discovery],"
applies only to cases of noncompliance after an order has been
entered. The sanctions include being held in contempt of court,'""
which is obviously inapplicable to noncompliance with a mere demand
not itself the subject of an enforcement order at the time of noncompliance.
Likewise, none of the sanctions provided for in Rule 37(B)(2)
seems to have any applicability in the case of an investigative demand
that has not been complied with, those sanctions being as follows:
(a) the court may order that the matter regarding which the order
compelling discovery was made or any other designated facts shall be
taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance
with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b) the court may refuse to allow the disobedient party to support
or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibit him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(c) the court may strike out pleadings or parts thereof, or stay
further proceedings until its order is obeyed, or dismiss the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or render a judgment by default
against the disobedient party.
The only real sanction under section 1331.16(J), it appears, is the
imposition of expenses on the noncompliant demandee, if the court
finds his noncompliance to be in bad faith or for the purpose of delay.
(d)

Obstruction.

The Ohio Act provides criminal penalties for a violation of division
(K) of section 1331.16. It is a felony of the fourth degree' for any
person "purposely [to] remove from any place, conceal, withhold,
destroy, mutilate, alter, or by any other means falsify any documentary material that is the subject of any investigative demand" with
intent to "avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance .
1.4.2.
139. Compare OHIO R. Civ. P. 37(A)(4) which provides for the imposition of expenses on either party found to be filing, or opposing, a motion for discovery relief, if
not substantially justified.
140.

Id. 37(B)(2)(d).

141. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.99(A) (Page Supp. 1978). A felony of the
fourth degree is punishable by imprisonment for a term ranging from six months to
five years and a fine of $2500. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(B)(4), (C)(4) (Page
1962).
142.

Id. § 1331.16(K) (Page Supp. 1978).
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These penal provisions apply only in the case of documentary
materials; no criminal penalties are provided in the case of answers to
written interrogatories or oral testimony, except to the extent that the
perjury statutes"4 3 may apply to false statements under oath.
VI.

(a)

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.

Confidentiality.

Violations of the Act's confidentiality provisions1 '4 by employees
of the office of the Attorney General are punished as misdemeanors of
the first degree.'" The confidentiality provisions protect only
documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, and
transcripts of oral testimony provided pursuant to an investigative demand; they do not protect against disclosure of information furnished
to the Attorney General or his designated representatives by other
public officers, under the command of section 1331.16(0).
Persons required to furnish confidential information of any kind
to state or other public officers may wish to consider in that connection the adequacy of existing safeguards of their confidentiality.
In any event, as noted above, the Attorney General and his
designated representative are free to use any information or documentary materials provided pursuant to an I.D. in any grand jury investigation or, after reasonable notice to the provider of the information or materials (presumably affording him an opportunity to object
proor seek judicial relief), in the conduct of any case or other official
4 6
ceeding involving an alleged violation of the Valentine Act.'
(b)

Return of documentary materials.

Section 1331.16(N) requires that copies of documentary materials
made available pursuant to a demand, but not answers to written interrogatories or transcripts of oral testimony, be returned, without a request therefor, when no longer required for a pending proceeding, or
in connection with the original investigation, or in any case 24 months
after being made available, unless the Attorney General files a request
for an extension with an appropriate common pleas court. Once copies
have passed into the control of a court or grand jury, no return
provisions are applicable under the Act.
143. Id. §§ 2921.11-.13 (Page 1962).
144. Id. § 1331.16(M) (Page Supp. 1978).
145. Id. § 1331.99(B). A misdemeanor of the first degree is punishable by imprisonment of up to six months and a fine of $1000. Id. § 2929.21(B)(1), (C)(1) (Page
1962).
146. Id. § 1331.16(M) (Page Supp. 1978).
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(c) Effect of I.D. on action for violation.
The Attorney General is not bound, in filing any complaint for
violation of the Valentine Act, by the contents of an investigative demand, and is not thereby limited in his use of evidence in "such an action." '1 7 Moreover, nothing contained in the new Act impairs the
authority of the Attorney General or his representatives to submit
evidence to any grand jury regarding a violation of the Valentine Act,
to compel the production of evidence before any grand jury, or to institute any proceeding for the enforcement of any order or process
issued in execution of such power or to punish disobedience of any
such order or process."8

(d) Jurisdiction of Common Pleas Courts.
Section 1331.16(P) gives jurisdiction to any court of common pleas
in which a request is filed under section 1331.16 to hear and determine
the matter presented and to enter an order as may be required to carry
into effect the provisions of the chapter.
VII.

CONCLUSION

When a client consults counsel with an Ohio investigative demand
newly served upon him, what should counsel do? The following steps
are suggested:
(a) Check the demand as to form and substance against the requirements of the Act.
(b) Contact the representative of the Attorney General named in
the demand and ascertain whether he is an employee of the Attorney
General's office.
(c) Ascertain the date of mailing of the demand.
(d) Find out as much as possible about the nature of the inquiry
being made, and whether or not the client is a possible or probable
target; and consider whether there are grounds for challenging the
propriety of the demand.
(e) Explore the possibility of limiting the search required to be
made, the documents to be produced, or the inquiry to be made.
(f) Explain to the Attorney General's representative that, even
though counsel anticipates full cooperation and expects to work out
satisfactory arrangements for compliance with the demand,
147. id. § 1331.16(Q).
148. Id. § 1331.16(R). In Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362
(Mo. App. 1973), the demandee unsuccessfully contended that service of an investigative demand and an opportunity to be heard were prerequisites to the commencement of an unfair practices action against it. No such contention is available
under the Ohio Act.
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nonetheless, for jurisdictional reasons, counsel feels obliged to file a
prompt request to modify or set aside the I.D., requesting, among
other things, a reasonable time extension for compliance.
(g) Prepare and file such a request, including in it such protective
requirements as counsel may deem appropriate, considering, in that
connection, the cautionary comments contained in this article.
(h) Stipulate with the Attorney General's representative to put
over any hearing on the request for relief pending the completion of
negotiations for appropriate compliance arrangements, compliance,
and acceptance of compliance.
(i) Negotiate an agreement, reminding the Attorney General's
representative of the numerous uncertainties and ambiguities in the
Act which may need to be resolved by litigation if they are not satisfactorily resolved by agreement.
(j) Prepare the client for compliance with the demand, as
modified by agreement, and see to it that he "fully" complies, within
the meaning of the statute.
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